


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TOTAL ARMY CULTURE-- THE CIVILIAN CONNECTION

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL WILLIAM S. SKINNER, JR.
United States Army

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TOTAL ARMY CULTURE--THE CIVILIAN CONNECTION

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by
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ABSTRACT

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The focus for the Army must be on the total force, a Total Army forged through a team effort between all components: Active, Reserve, National Guard and the Civilian work force. This team effort becomes a critical factor during this period of transformation to a smaller force structure. Critical to this transformation to a smaller Army are the Army's core values, which underlie a Total Army corporate culture. If two of the Army's "subcultures", the active military and the civilian work force, do not share those values or if underlying systemic causes create a separation between military and civilian "subcultures", the results are civilians who neither feel, nor are, accepted as an essential part of the Total Army Team. We need to consider and address the issues that tend to contribute to a "we/they" attitude and to find a workable methodology for improving the Army's culture. Total Army Quality provides a methodology for change. Fully implemented, it will provide for a productive working relationship between the Active and Civilian components of the Total Army Team.

TOTAL ARMY CULTURE--THE CIVILIAN CONNECTION

INTRODUCTION

Today, more than at any time in history, the Army is facing an era of profound change. The manner in which the Army manages that change, the leadership it displays, the actions taken as we restructure could well make the difference between success or failure on the battlefields of tomorrow where American forces may be involved.

A total force, trained and ready to fight...serving the nation at home and abroad...a strategic force capable of decisive victory --this vision for the U. S. Army can be obtained only if the Army can capitalize on our greatest and most valuable strength, the dedicated people who are the Army.¹ These dedicated people reflect the diversity of our free society and provide limitless capabilities to the Army, endowing it with great potential.²

The Army must focus on the total force, a total Army forged on a team effort between all components: Active, Reserve, National Guard and the Civilian work force. This team effort becomes a critical factor during this period of transformation to a smaller force structure.

The civilians and soldiers who make up the Army are representative of a diverse range of cultural backgrounds. This diversity and the values reflected by those joining the Army Team represent the fabric of American society. But upon entering the military service, the civilian employee and the soldier are expected to adopt the values that make up the Army's culture.

Those values have been identified as organizational values of Duty, Integrity, Loyalty, and Selfless Service and as individual values of Courage, Commitment, Candor, and Competence. As these values are assimilated and adopted, they promote mutual confidence and understanding between all soldiers and civilians.³ To be successful, the Army must be served by professionals who both understand and display the organizational and individual values that comprise the Army's culture.

Transformation to a smaller Army will critically test the Army's core competencies and enduring values. They are the foundation and cornerstones on which our future capabilities rest.⁴ They make up the culture of America's Army.

Weak or strong, culture has a powerful influence throughout an organization; it affects everything--promotions, awards, and decisions. Culture is a major determinate of success.⁵

For any organization to operate efficiently and improve, the cultural values must permeate the entire organization. These values must be shared and exercised by all members of that organization. In any organization with a strong culture, like the Army, any employee or member, at any time, can tell you what the organization stands for and values. When any part of the organization establishes a set of values or beliefs that are different from the espoused and established organizational beliefs, it then becomes all too easy for the tail to wag the cultural dog.⁶ Such a separation can lead to a loss of productivity, quality and teamwork--the mission can be

jeopardized.

To some degree, either perceived or otherwise, this kind of disunity has befallen the Army. It exists between the active component and the civilian component of the Total Army Team.

Purpose

This paper will discuss the perceptions, value differences, and systemic problems currently impacting on the Army's culture. This discussion will address the issues that tend to contribute to a "we/they" separation between the Active and Civilian "subcultures" of the Total Army Team. As a result, some Army civilians do not feel accepted as an essential part of that team. Finally this discussion will define a strategy for strengthening the Army's culture to better incorporate civilians as an integral part of the Total Army.

Methodology

Through analysis of the results of past surveys, and Department of the Army Inspector General and Special Task Force findings, the problem and the issues will be identified. Next, recommendations from those offices and those of the author will be presented as a solution or strategy to help improve and reinforce the culture of the Total Army.

BACKGROUND

Culture is made up of the body of beliefs members have about the organization, and what the organization stands for, and about their expectations of one another. Culture establishes the basic "dos" and "don'ts"--a code that stipulates what everyone must do

or avoid doing to remain a member in good standing. More importantly, the "dos" positively specify what the organization expects of its members, for the general well-being of all.⁷

Values thus become statements of what is important. Values should set organizational priorities, objectives and goals.

Stated values are determined by the executive leadership. These stated values provide policy guidance for the organization.

Operating values are reflected in individual perceptions of what is actually important. Subordinates learn from rules, operating procedures, de facto priorities, examples and requirements set by their direct leadership.⁸

Importantly, stated and operating values should be complimentary. They should reflect the same principles and be consistent with the needs of society and the organization.⁹

The culture of the Army is built on these values, which then form the foundation for the Army. These values foster innovation and stability; they sustain the balance necessary in this period of change and uncertainty.¹⁰ These core values are the constants that give our Army the competitive edge over our potential adversaries.

The Army's Culture

Like any organization, the Army has a defined culture. That culture is derived from certain basic beliefs, values and attitudes. The Army's culture is the body of beliefs and values that members have about the organization; it substantiates what the organization stands for: duty, integrity, loyalty, selfless

service. This culture also includes the expectations that the members of the organization have of one another: courage, commitment, candor, competence. These values stipulate what is important to the organization and serve to set priorities, the objectives and the goals that the organization strives for. Subordinates within the Army, both military and civilian, learn these values from the established rules, from the practiced procedures, and from the priorities that are set by their leadership. These values are either reinforced or negated through the examples set and the actual work ethic within the organization.¹¹ The values of the Army are a part of our National culture and can be traced to the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.

THE PROBLEM IDENTIFIED

As stated earlier, when these values are not completely shared within the organization, differences arise, conflicting perceptions are formed. The organization loses cohesion and missions may not be achieved.

In order to assess possible cultural differences between the military and civilian work force, surveys were conducted and the Department of the Army, Inspector General's Office took a close look at the Civilian Personnel Management System in 1985, with a followup in 1990.

The results identified military and civilian perceptions, value differences, and systemic differences between the military and civilian personnel management systems that have a negative

impact on the Total Army Culture.

Perceptions

A Command and General Staff College survey revealed that the military holds some negative perceptions of their civilian counterparts:

1. If civilians are serious about selfless service, they should not get reward money.
2. Good civilians are in a minority.
3. Civilian interest is personal.
4. It's impossible to fire a civilian.
5. If civilians want to be part of units, commanders need to be able to discipline/fire them.
6. There are inequities between benefits and entitlements: awards, PCS.¹²

These perceptions reveal a lack of understanding on the part of one "subculture", the military, of another "subculture", the civilian work force. Such perceptions can lead to problems that become counter-productive, that in fact can impact on mission accomplishment.

Value Differences

Other differences were found through a comparison of values. The Army Research Institute surveyed military and civilian personnel and compared their ratings on values. This comparison showed that the military and civilian work force shared nine out of the ten top values and seventeen of the top twenty values. Even so, the civilian ratings of the "top 20" were generally higher than those of the military.¹³ (See Chart 1.) Of interest in this value comparison was the finding that the civilian ratings of American values and of soldier values were often higher than those of the military. Yet the civilian

ratings of the "ideal soldier" values were similar to the military.¹⁴ Loyalty to the United States, to the Army, to the unit, and teamwork were all values rated higher by civilians. (See Chart 2.) Some of the values rated lower by civilians were: disciplined/battle, social recognition, the right to bear arms and concern for soldiers. (See Chart 3.)

CHART 1
CIVILIAN TOP 20 VALUES

<u>VALUE</u>	<u>CIVILIAN</u> <u>RATING</u>	<u>MILITARY</u> <u>RATING</u>
Freedom	1	1
Family Security	2	3
Doing Your Job	3	12
Self Respect	4	2
Being Honest/Truthful	5	10
Taking Responsibility For Action	6	7
Loyalty to U.S.	7	9
National Security	8	6
Stand Up For What Is Right	9	4
Sense of Accomplishment	10	8
A World At Peace	11	16
Freedom of Speech	12	11
Drive to Succeed/Advance	13	15
Happiness	14	14
Voting	15	25
Care of Wounded	16	5
The Constitution	17	23
Freedom of Religion	18	19
Teamwork	19	33
Treating Everyone Fairly	20	13

Chart 1. SOURCE: TOTAL ARMY CULTURE, Briefing, 1992, 14.

CHART 2
VALUES RATED HIGHER BY CIVILIANS

Loyalty To The U. S.
Loyalty To The Army
Loyalty To The Unit
Responsibility
Teamwork
Skill
Honesty
World Peace
Family Security
The U. S. Constitution
Freedom of the Press
Right to Vote
Military Courtesy
High Moral Standards

CHART 2. SOURCE: TOTAL ARMY CULTURE,
Briefing, 1992, 15.

CHART 3
VALUES RATED LOWER BY CIVILIANS

Disciplined/Battle
Beautiful World
Social Recognition
Exciting Life
The Right to Bear Arms
Concern for Soldiers
Fair Military Justice
Fair Treatment of Soldiers
Military Bearing
Fitness/Stamina
Wealth and Luxury
Living Near Friends
Able to Rest
Able to Relax

CHART 3. SOURCE: TOTAL ARMY CULTURE,
Briefing, 1992, 16.

SYSTEMIC PROBLEMS

Inspector General's Findings

Looking further into these perceptions, differences, and systemic problems the Department of the Army Inspector General conducted a special inspection of the Army Civilian Personnel Management System, worldwide, in April through December of 1985. This inspection revealed:

1. An ineffective and inefficient system clogged in a complex maze of laws and regulations, encumbered by layers of bureaucracy, and slow to change.
2. Poor communications and apathy among many military leaders further aggravate the problem.
3. The system fails to adequately support the employee, the manager, or Army mission accomplishment.
4. The overwhelming complexity of the system causes or contributes to all other problems. Few understand the system and fewer still can effectively use it to support mission accomplishment.
5. Army leaders are failing to provide effective leadership to Army civilians and rarely are they held accountable for failures in civilian personnel management.¹⁵

A followup inspection was conducted by the Department of Army Inspector General from January through June 1990 to assess the status of the 1985 findings in the areas of system complexity and communications, Civilian Personnel Office support, military management of civilian personnel, people issues, management and other issues.¹⁶

Although Civilian Personnel Management had improved since the 1985 Special Inspection, problems degrading efficiency and

effectiveness continued to hamper users at all organizational levels. Underlying these problems are four frequently interrelated, systemic causes: complexity, communications, Civilian Personnel Office support, and leadership.¹⁷ This followup inspection revealed:

1. Complexity continues to be the most pervasive of the systemic root causes. Aggravating the other root causes, complexity frequently renders the system unintelligible and unmanageable. Much of the complexity does not stem from Army policies and procedures. Law and implementing instructions from several external agencies lead to misunderstanding and misinterpretation by managers, employees, and personnelists alike. Bureaucratic layers within the Army reinforce the maze.
2. Communications have improved at DA, Senior Managerial, supervisory, and CPO levels.
3. Senior managers, supervisors, and employees complained that personnelists in the same CPO branches frequently provided conflicting information. Frequent employee turnover, lack of training, and the system's complexity contributed to this situation.
4. Military leaders comprise a large part of the civilian work force management structure. The followup Inspection revealed that military concern and involvement with CPM increased since 1985.¹⁸

Task Force Findings

To further document the differences between military and civilian "subcultures" within the Army and the causes that attribute to those differences, consider the Civilian Leader Development Task Force Final Report and Action Plan recommendations, prepared for the Commanding General, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. This study was finalized in April

1990.

This report documents approved findings and recommendations of the Special Task Force on Civilian Leader Development.¹⁹ This study encompassed part of a larger charter of the Army's Chief of Staff, which began in 1987 to determine the status of leader development in the Army and to recommend what adjustments were required to improve the system to carry the Army into the 21st Century.²⁰ Originally the study focused on commissioned officers. In 1988, the Commanding General of Training and Doctrine Command commissioned two separate task forces to conduct similar studies of leader development in the noncommissioned officer corps and in the civilian work force.²¹

The following five findings are drawn regarding the civilian work force:

1. Total Army Culture is not linked together, there is a need to enhance the military's ability to lead and care for civilians.
2. The Army's existing civilian leader development system is not as efficient as it could be, although some components are in fact efficient and effective.
3. Effective civilian leadership training initiatives can be identified and need to be integrated into a cost effective, progressive, sequential system for all civilian leaders.
4. Resources need to be prioritized to more effectively promote civilian leader development.
5. Leader positions and positions which track to leader positions (e.g., career entry level and intern positions) are critical entry points to the civilian leader development system. Selections to such positions must include consideration of leader competencies and demonstrated talent for leadership.²²

The task force conducting this study further concluded that

Total Army Culture was the primary finding; it permeates the entire group of findings.²³ Leadership, or the failure of military and civilians to lead the civilian members of the force, is also related to the first finding.²⁴

This study surfaced five issues relating to Army culture, especially to the civilians' place in that culture:

First, we need better integration of civilian and military members of the Total Army into a uniform corporate culture. This is important because as civilian leadership and management roles expand, civilian and military members must increasingly work together to maximize a Total Army concept. The Army should initiate programs to establish a Total Army Culture; such programs would inform civilians of the role of Army civilians and would in turn aid in establishing baseline attitudes of Army leaders.²⁵

Secondly, there is no standard new employee orientation to Army mission and culture established for civilians entering Civil Service to indoctrinate them into the Army. Soldiers receive this as they process through basic and advanced individual training; this "greening" process aids in establishing a bond or sense of camaraderie.²⁶ But civilians receive no such basic orientation to the culture.

Third, supervisory accountability for civilian career development is not clearly defined and can be traced to the complexity of the Civilian Personnel Management System. Duties and responsibilities are associated with career development of

subordinates, but they are ill defined and insufficiently evaluated.²⁷

Fourth, only military examples are examined in Army Leadership publications; the civilian work force is not explicitly addressed. Army leadership doctrine focuses on the Active and Reserve components, but does not address the sustaining base work force, the civilian component.²⁸

Fifth, Military commanders and supervisors require increased training in Civilian Personnel Management, since military personnel do not understand this complex management system.²⁹

Task Force Recommendations

The Civilian Leader Development Action Plan provided fifteen recommendations leading to a methodology for correcting the short-comings or findings that are enumerated above. Five of these recommendations address cultural issues, three address civilian leader development, five are concerned with civilian leadership training, and two relate to resource issues. (These recommendations incorporate those made during the Department of the Army Inspector General's inspections cited earlier.) If implemented, they will serve to correct perceptions and reinforce values.

All of these recommendations are important. Milestones for their implementation were established for each with assigned completion dates. Many have already been implemented or are scheduled for implementation. The recommendations that pertain to civilian leader development, civilian leadership training and

resources are beyond the scope of this study. However, they are closely tied to a total culture. There is admittedly some overlap among all of the findings. Suffice it to say that for the Army to "be all it can be", it must provide for the development and training of both military and civilian leaders.

This development must be comprehensive, progressive, and sequential.³⁰ Leadership skills are basically the same. The same leadership skills are required to lead soldiers in battle, to lead base operations, readiness/mobilization, or to lead in the sustaining base. Civilians require the same basic leadership skills as do their fellow military leaders.³¹

To be effective, the Army must ensure that its core values support and reinforce the development and demonstration of leader skills, knowledge, and attitudes. Military and civilian leaders must be capable of actively educating, guiding, counseling, and mentoring their subordinates (military and civilian) in Army values, ethics, and standards--all the while fulfilling technical requirements.³² Five recommendations or issues relate to the establishment of a Total Army Culture, which is central to this discussion.

Without doubt, we need a better integration of the civilian and military members of the Total Army into a uniform corporate culture. To obtain that end, the recommendations made call for the establishment of systems, policies, goals, and practices that will support and reinforce leader capabilities, values, and ethics.³³ Within the Army, customs, traditions, and operations

are not always fully understood by the civilian work force. On the other hand, the military does not understand the civilian work force. As the Army restructures and civilians assume more of the management and leadership responsibilities, it becomes paramount that the military and civilians work more closely together.³⁴

This team effort will require that Army culture, systems, policies, goals, and practices support and reinforce leader core values. Military leader development and training has been successful because military culture and the operational environment reinforces and builds on these competencies and values. A total approach to leadership training that includes the civilian work force and that reinforces leader values and competencies could do the same for the total force.³⁵ Programs and actions recommended to help accomplish this end were provided in the Civilian Leader Development Action Plan:

MILESTONES	DATE
1. Establish a Total Army Culture Construct. ("paradigm shift")	completed Jan 91
2. Conduct Total Army Culture Workshops.	completed Jan 92
3. Develop CSA Video communicating importance of Total Army Culture/ Leadership Ethic. ³⁶	completed Feb 92

Other recommended actions are believed essential to promoting a Total Army Culture. These actions will help to integrate the military and civilian personnel management systems to the extent possible and support the cultural change:

MILESTONES	DATE
1. Implement Total Army Performance System(TAPES). -complete MACOM staffing/ OPM approval	Dec 91
-begin phased implemen- tation	JUL 92
2. Make Personnel Proponency Work. -Resolve Resourcing Issues	OCT 91
-Publish AR 600-3	MAR 92
-Publish Users'Guide	May 92
3. Initiate institutional- ization of the deployable civilian concept. -meet with proponents to define proponent's mobilization planning responsibilities	Jan 92
4. Transition to centralized school selection process. -AMSC	Nov 91
-SSC	Jan 92
5. Integrate award policy (to include conduct of ceremonies).	Sep 92
6. Where appropriate and feasible, provide common training opportunities to Total Army force. -identify schools/training population/resourcing. ³⁷	Dec 92

The second recommendation addresses the linkage between enlisted, officer, and civilian orientations. It calls for a "greening" process that establishes an Army bond, a sense of camaraderie. This orientation would include: mission briefings, Army organizations, MACOMs and missions, military customs and ethics, chain of command, general worker traits and attitudes, military/civilian team cohesion, and facilities. Actions recommended by the study:

MILESTONE	DATE
1. Assess and evaluate feedback on new employee orientation programs.	(completed)
2. Forward a program of instruction for Total Army Culture course to MACOM Commanders.	(completed)
3. Produce Total Army Video to orient civilian members of the force.	Nov 92
4. Implement/show video to all new civilian employees. ³⁸	Jan 93

The third recommendation focuses on introducing subordinates to supervisory performance standards. Responsibility for supervisor development falls to local commanders and first line supervisors. In addition to on-the-job training, supervisors are required to work with those under their charge in developing individual development plans. This particular study identified a need to encourage supervisors to provide career development counselling to subordinates and to include it as part of the performance standards and appraisals of military and civilian supervisors.³⁹ Actions recommended to help improve this area are provided below:

MILESTONES	DATE
1. Include personnel management as a critical element for supervisors performance standards. (AR 690-400)	(completed)
2. Publish CSA communication to commanders emphasizing supervisory responsibility. ⁴⁰	(completed)

The fourth recommendation for building a Total Army corporate culture concerns the integration of civilians into

leadership publications. Army civilians lead and serve in positions across the Army. Current leadership doctrine focuses on the Active and Reserve components, but it fails to address the civilian work force. Actions recommended in this area are:

MILESTONES	DATE
1. Include civilian leader development in DA PAM 600-32, Leader Development.	(completed)
2. CSA communicate statement of Total Army leadership philosophy to commanders.	(completed)
3. Submit proposed revisions to field manuals with sustaining base emphasis. ⁴¹	JUL 92

The fifth and final recommendation to help refine a total Army culture was to integrate Civilian Personnel Management (CPM) training into Army schools to enhance the chain-of-command's ability to lead and care for Army civilians. Actions recommended:

MILESTONES	DATE
1. Add material on leading civilians to MQS III Manual.	Jan 92
2. Coordinate with TRADOC schools on selection of appropriate MOS for CPM tasks.	Jan 92
3. Prepare CPM tasks for SAT regulation.	Feb 92
4. Review and prioritize TRADOC courses for CPM training. ⁴²	Feb 92

The results of the above surveys, inspections, and planning groups confirm that the perceptions and differences between and among the military and civilian work force are real. The problem exists. It requires attention and correction. The differences

in values, although minor, reveal a failure to internalize and reinforce the Army's organizational and individual values. The systemic problems evident in differences between the Military and Civilian Personnel Management Systems hamper the reinforcement of the Army's values and promote differences, rather than building on the strengths of the organization. These differences appear to be the major contributor to a "we/they" attitude. The perceptions identified can be attributed to both a lack of value reinforcement and to systemic differences in the Personnel Management System. All of these differences and symptoms can be improved upon. Solving these problems will produce a stronger Army culture.

The recommendations contained in the Civilian Leader Development Plan offer a start toward building an improved culture within the Army. This cultural change will become ingrained over time and will build team work as the Army aligns systems, policies, goals, and practices that support and reinforce leader competencies and core values.

Total Army Quality--A Recommendation

Taking this culture-building a step further and truly building a Total Army Corporate Culture requires a shift in mind set or a shift in the management philosophy that builds on the reinforcement of the Army's core values and assists in the realignment of the Personnel Management System. This management philosophy shift has already been implemented and is in its formative stages within the Army today. That management

philosophy is designated as Total Army Quality (TAQ).

TAQ is the Army's management philosophy. It is the basis for related management policies and management responsibilities for the Total Army. The Army management philosophy is to do the right things, the right way, for the right reasons, and to constantly strive for improvement.⁴³ TAQ is people oriented. It establishes an atmosphere conducive to team building through participation. TAQ is designed to channel the energy of every Army organization towards achieving the Army's leadership vision through the goals established, the actions taken, and the results obtained. TAQ will help insure that these stated values and goals of the Army become the operating values--the individual perceptions of what actually is important. Implementation of TAQ within the Army is not optional.⁴⁴ This management philosophy progresses through four phases: awareness, assessment, team building and action. The Army has accomplished the awareness and assessment stages(at least as it pertains to the military/civilian cultural differences) at the top levels of the Army. Now the Army is beginning to focus on the team building and action stages to bridge the gap between the Active and Civilian "subcultures".

During the awareness phase, the Army's leaders were introduced to TAQ and culture: what they are, how they work and why TAQ is such an important management tool. In the second phase, assessment, the Army began the process of assessing organizational activities in three key areas: attitudes,

objective performance, and quality audit. During this assessment process (Surveys, Inspector General Inspections, and Task Force Study), which was covered in detail above, cultural and systemic differences between the civilian and active components were identified.

The actions initiated during the fourth phase of the TAQ process, based on results of the assessment phase, will assist in building the teamwork required in today's Total Army. As mentioned earlier, the Army established a Total Army Culture construct (paradigm shift) in January 1991. It renewed its commitment to TAQ through a culture workshop and a Chief of Staff video during January and February 1992. These actions pointed out the absolute necessity of military and civilians working together effectively as members of one team.⁴⁵

Other actions, planned or completed, to build a Total Army culture are the implementation of a Total Army Performance System, the establishment of a Personnel Propensity, the institutionalization of the deployable civilian concept, the transition to a centralized school selection process for civilians, the establishment of an integrated award policy, and where appropriate and feasible, the provision of common training opportunities to the Total Army force.⁴⁶ A new civilian employee orientation video covering Army mission, structure, organization, goals, systems, culture, and values was completed in November 1992 and implemented in January 1993.⁴⁷ Personnel Management has been included as a critical criterion for

supervisor performance standards (AR 690-400). Proposed revisions of Army leadership publications, to include civilian examples, have either been forwarded to the field or are in the planning stages.⁴⁸ Additionally, Civilian Personnel Management(CPM) material has been added to the Military Qualifications Standards III Manual; further Training and Doctrine Command courses have been reviewed and prioritized for CPM training.⁴⁹

The above actions are examples of systemic changes that will lead to a stronger, better focused, Total Army Team dedicated to the same shared values. This teamwork will be critical during this era of transformation. At the highest echelon leadership is committed to this management philosophy. But we have yet to see the implementation of TAQ at all levels in the Army--all the way down to the individual soldier and the individual civilian. This point implies that the Army as a whole has not yet adopted this management philosophy. Merely stating that it will be adopted is not enough. It has to be implemented as both the stated and operating goal of the Army. At the unit level, TAQ is just a new term or buzz word that relates to leadership and the fundamentals of leadership that have been practiced by the military leaders of small units since the beginning of time. The principles of leadership are timeless and have been proven over the years. The philosophy of TAQ solidly supports practical leadership-- taking care of soldiers and mission accomplishment(internal and external customer

satisfaction). We all know how to implement those skills. TAQ allows us to build on these skills, to teach them to others, and to improve the way we manage throughout the Army.⁵⁰ TAQ, if properly implemented, serves as the catalyst. TAQ is a valuable management tool, a philosophy that can assist the Army and all of us as a part of the Army in achieving goals and objectives that support mission accomplishment, while improving the culture of the Army. However, to be effective it must receive the active support of the entire Army. TAQ has to become part of the Army's core value system, both stated and operating. Not everyone in the Army has bought into this new philosophy. Many still feel that TAQ is just another "management fad" that will go away with a change in administration.⁵¹ There are many skeptics of this management style. Thus it will take a dedicated effort on the part of senior Army leadership to make it a reality. Simply stated, if our strategic leadership is not committed to TAQ and if they do not make it an operating goal as opposed to a stated goal, then it will become just another program doomed to failure.⁵²

So the key is to implement and market TAQ as an integral part of the Army. This philosophy should be tied to the basic leadership principles already accepted as part of our Army: know your men, know your business, know yourself.⁵³ Once accepted, TAQ is designed to produce continuous improvement and to achieve high-quality performance in day-to-day operations as we plan for and manage a changing Army and work to build a better corporate

culture.⁵⁴ The key to an improved Army corporate culture is team-building. TAQ offers the management tools that provide our leadership at all levels with the implementing skills to enhance the Army's Total Culture.

STRATEGY

A major challenge to our strategic leadership is to reinforce and build on the core values that make up our Total Army Culture--to ensure that both the Active and Civilian "subcultures" are trained and aware of these organizational and individual values that make up the Army's culture. This challenge requires a strategy, a process for implementing TAQ within the Army. This strategy will refine the Army's culture and aid in eliminating systemic problems that impede the total team effort required by the Civilian and Active components of the Army.

The strategy for implementing TAQ, which is designed to refine the Army's culture through team-building and the reinforcement of core values, should follow the steps outlined below:

1. LEADERSHIP: Leaders should correct the cause of mistakes through education and partnership with subordinates, civilians and military; leaders should take the initiative to demonstrate a commitment to the TAQ concept.
2. AWARENESS: Build TAQ awareness through training that starts at the top and moves down to the last man or woman in the last squad or office.

3. COMMUNICATIONS: Establish communications that flow up and down and across the organization. Remove barriers to communications and allow decisions to be made at the lowest levels.

4. VISION: Create a constancy of purpose through the establishment of a well developed vision, mission essential task lists, and long range plans. This should be accomplished through active participation of the organization's leader and the key players within the organization.

5. CUSTOMERS: Focus on the needs of the internal and external customers, their expectations and requirements. Involve customers in planning and decisionmaking.

6. EARLY EFFORTS: Select early efforts that have a good chance of success, are visible throughout the organization, and can improve the organization for leaders, subordinates, and customers.

7. TEAMWORK: Build teamwork through the implementation and interaction of Executive Steering Councils, Quality Management Boards, and Process Action Teams.

8. REINFORCEMENT: Reinforce training top to bottom. TAQ is a continuing process that requires continued emphasis and training. We can not stop advocating it after the initial introduction.

9. TRUST: Build trust, respect, and confidence. If subordinates know that their opinions are important, heard, and acted upon; then they will feel a part of the team and will share their knowledge and creativity.

10. IMPROVEMENT: Establish an environment in which continuous improvement is a way of life. Everyone in the organization should constantly look for ways to improve.⁵⁵

CONCLUSION

The vision for America's Army is "A Total Force, Trained and Ready to Fight...Serving The Nation Home and Aboard...A Strategic Force Capable of Decisive Victory."⁵⁶ In order for the Army to meet that task (END), all components of our Army (MEANS) are critical to battlefield success. How we plan for and manage change now and in the future can be affected by the TAQ process (WAYS).⁵⁷ TAQ provides the way and the procedures to assist and encourage the establishment of a Total Army Culture construct, to augment a paradigm shift. The Active and Civilian components of the Total Army are in the process of forging a part of that Total Army Team. They seek to build on the Army's culture and capture the best of both components. Total Army Quality, the Army's Total Quality Management System, provides the road map, guidance and methodology to systematically assess our organizations, products, services, and systems. TAQ provides the methodology for changing the culture of the Army, while at the same time allowing us to improve quality, reduce duplication and improve performance.⁵⁸

TAQ will allow us to improve our Total Army Culture, as we restructure the force, while we achieve the Army's vision. This philosophy will help us to make "one Army" a reality, to change perspectives, to promote military and civilian "esprit de corps"

and to foster appreciation of necessary differences.⁵⁹ This philosophy encourages the Army to recognize diversity, to build upon and retain the strengths of each "subculture"; to expand common ground, reduce differences and emphasize similarities; to increase awareness and respect.⁶⁰ Total Army Quality offers a methodology that reinforces and builds on the total organizational culture and provides the connection between the Active and Civilian Components of the Total Army Team.

ENDNOTES

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¹¹Department of the Army Pamphlet 600-80, 17.

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²⁵Ibid. 30.

²⁶Ibid.

²⁷Ibid. 31.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid. 32.

³⁰Ibid. 3.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid. 2.

³³Ibid. 1.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵Ibid. 2.

³⁶Ibid. 1.

³⁷d. 3-4.

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³⁹Ibid. 8.

⁴⁰Ibid. 7.

⁴¹Ibid. 9.

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⁴⁴U. S. Department of the Army. Army Leadership For Quality Concept Plan, 8 April 1992, Executive Summary.

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⁴⁷Ibid. 5.

⁴⁸Ibid. 8-9.

⁴⁹Ibid. 11.

⁵⁰James F. Brownlowe, Capt. "What's So New About Total Quality Leadership?", Marine CORPs GAZETTE, December 1991, 14.

⁵¹John J. Sullivan, COL. "Total Quality Management For Warfighters", Marine Corps GAZETTE, December 1991, 14.

⁵²Ibid. 15.

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⁵⁴Army Focus 1992. 17.

⁵⁵Sullivan. Marine Corps GAZETTE, 15-16.

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⁵⁷Ibid. 14.

⁵⁸Ibid. 17.

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⁶⁰Ibid. 26.

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